Sermon: Iraq - Moral Reflections

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Iraq - Moral Reflections

By Charles Rush

February 23, 2003

ere are times in life when you pray for the courage to speak clearly your convictions. The present moment, it seems to me, is not one of them. This is a season when, at least for me, you pray for a wisdom that is not obvious in the midst of turbulence.

I want to raise a few issues this morning, hoping that in the process of debate itself will help the Spirit move amongst us and we will be the wiser for it. In the early days of our country, the town turned out for worship at the Congregational Church and returned later in the day to discuss the local politics. Same people, same place, different prism of their common life. When we had debates over family issues when my children were young, one of my kids used to say that so and so was ‘more righter' or so and so was ‘less wronger'. I do believe that together we can become more righter and less wronger.

Before we get to the specific issue of Iraq, I want to venture a comment on the broader situation we are in. It causes all of us concern and if you have read the advertisment in the NYT written by the novelist/farmer Wendell Berry in the past couple weeks, he gave cogent voice to the concern.

In the aftermath of the attack on September 11th, President Bush, seeking to console a shocked nation and speak of our considerable resolve as a people, effectively declared war on terrorism itself. It was an understandable declaration at the time.

But there are a couple of serious problems with such an open-ended declaration that we will shortly begin to realize. In the first place, you can never definitively say that the war on terrorism has been won which means that we have committed ourselves to a state of perpetual war. Now a state of war necessarily entails a temporary suspension of civil liberties and an erosion of freedom for all citizens, which the vast majority of us are willing to endure for limited duration and a productive end. We don't mind the thorough check of papers re-entering our country, sometimes being shaken down to our shorts at the airport. We understand the need for incarcerating suspected terrorists indefinitely as ‘military prisoners' at Guantanamo Bay so that they can be thoroughly interrogated.

However, the suspension of civil liberties undermines our Constitution, the very raison d'etre of our political being. Over a protracted period of time, we cannot help but become hypocritical as we curtail freedoms for the sake of our freedom. This is inherently risky and none of us really want to live in that Orwellian ‘holding pattern' for very long. Yet, by declaring an open-ended war, we are implicitly committing ourselves in that direction. Suffice it to say, it is a road I don't think any of us really wants to go down.

Secondly, we ought to acknowledge that there is a legitimate concern that this open-ended declaration has on other nations. They are wondering exactly to what extent our country feels entitled to interfere in the internal life of other countries as a ‘defensive measure to counteract terrorism'. We have not yet begun to articulate the limits on our mission, I think, in large part, because we don't have an idea yet. Especially set against our overreaching history in our desire to contain Communism from 1950-1980, other countries have some bitter memories of what we are willing to do in 3rd world countries in order to defend our way of life. There is a consensus of world opinion of the need to combat terrorism, there is consensus that we ought to lead, but it is not a carte blanche invitation. In fact, it is dependent on our garnering moral authority as we go. If other perceive the U.S. as bringing freedom and democracy to the rest of the world that leads to economic expansion, self-determination, human rights, equality of opportunity and toleration of dissent, people will not only respect our mission, they will pray for its success.

But if we are merely perceived as able to enforce our will due to overwhelming military and economic clout, we will only engender people to pull for the underdog, whoever that might be at the moment.

Finally, we have recently endorsed the strategy of a pre-emptive strike. On the one hand, it is an understandable response after having been pre-emptively attacked. It is really a pledge, in part, to the victims of this last attack that we will do everything we can to prevent victims in the future. However, for international relations, we are about to open a door that will have consequences that none of us can predict from here and some of them are likely to take on a life of their own. If the Civil war in Israel and Palestine is any indication of the logic of pre-emptive strikes, my prediction is that in a couple short decades, we will be working pretty hard to avoid situations where pre-emptive strikes need to be considered a serious option.

As to the moral wisdom of invading Iraq right now, the case for going to war, rests increasingly on two levels of consideration.

The first level is the threat that Iraq poses for international peace and stability. Secretary Powell's presentation was a condensed version of a fairly developed body of evidence, much of which is detailed in books written by defectors who were actually in the top leadership of the Iraqi government and military. The lengthy litany of human rights abuses are detailed regularly, particularly in the British papers, since a great community of Iraqi exiles have found a haven in London. The journal Foreign Affairs has devoted several lengthy articles in the past few years detailing the history of the Baath party that rules Iraq at present. It is a fascist party, developed in the late 30's, that utilized much of the national socialist program of the Nazi party and the fascist party in Franco's Spain. Hussein has added to this some of the techniques for rule learned from Stalin, to create a living nightmare for dissidents in his country. He has managed the considerable feat, after a couple decades of rule, of alienating so many people that I do not believe that he has one ally in the Middle East, despite their collective revulsion at the prospect of a prolonged military presence by the American forces.

The moral argument on this level is something like this. You have the position taken by Secretary Colin Powell that concern for the safety of future potential victims of biological or chemical attack warrants the invasion of Iraq and the complete eradication of their all such agents and the potential to develop them. Collateral damage done in Iraq, the potential cost of our soldiers being attacked with chemical weapons, the social disturbance that comes from a sweeping regime change- all of the collective difficulties that this war might bring are outweighed by our moral obligation to protect innocent victims of future attacks.

The moral argument against attacking Iraq is largely a procedural argument that has been put forth in two different ways. The French, the Germans and the Russians- the highest moral argument that they make is the suggestion that we can achieve containment of potential Iraqi destruction by flooding their country with enough inspectors and UN forces that they will be unable to actually use what they have or develop significant new biological or chemical weapons.

That view has been challenged vigorously by experts like Kenneth Pollack, the former C.I.A. analyst in charge of the Iraqi military, who wrote a short piece in the New York Times on Friday[i] that summarizes his book The Threatening Storm. Pollack argues that given the mobility of production for chemical and biological weapons, it is relatively easy to evade detection from even a great horde of inspectors and given the detailed history of deceit, deception and reckless judgment from Iraq in the last two decades, it is reckless to underestimate Iraq's intentions or ability to achieve them.

The second argument against invasion has made by senior leaders in the Pentagon, the views of which have been popularly heard by General Norman Schwarzkopf. They argue that, despite the fact that Iraq possess very deadly weapons of mass destruction, they military is so weakened and impoverished that they don't actually pose the threat to us that is so great we cannot live with it. There is a secondary argument that has been made with the analogy of dealing with a snake in a pit. If you just keep it in the pit, it isn't a harm to anyone. But if you poke it, it will strike at you. Not surprisingly, there are many generals that do not want to send our soldiers into a situation where they might have biological or chemical agents used on troops they are responsible for because we do not have adequate protection for them.

Support for this position has solidified this week as a number of European nations have argued this as a compromise position. As well the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury and the Catholic Archbishop of Westminster have issued statements of support. They recognize that Iraq is a threat, but not one that warrants military action at this time.

But there is another level of discussion that is taking shape as people begin to envision a Post-Sadam world. This justification goes beyond mere military objectives such as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction or dismantling the long-range missile capabilities.

It has to do with the broader stability that could result from developing a democratic regime in Iraq, a regime in dialogue with western values, with productive economic development with western trading partners. I want to be clear that this is not an official position taken by the Administration and yet, I am willing to guess that it is the unspoken moral that is guiding many of the leaders in the administration and will receive fuller discussion after military intervention is successful.

Probably the most articulate spokesman for this position has been Fouad Ajami, the professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Johns Hopkins. He wrote a widely read article in Foreign Affairs[ii] last month and many of you probably read an op-ed piece that he wrote in the Wall Street Journal recently[iii]. Nicholas Lemann also wrote a very good article on the same subject for the New Yorker last week.[iv]

Both of them suggest that the moral argument behind the strategic argument for intervention rests on the beneficent effects that could come a stable and democratic Iraq. They presume that the U.S. will have at least a 10 year military presence in Iraq that would put an effective brake on Iran's support for Hezbollah in the area, as well as a deter the broader terrorist cover provided in Syria and Lebanon. In general, Professor Ajami suggests that the possibility of U. S. intervention will encourage other Middle Eastern countries to begin to seriously deter terrorist leaders under their jurisdiction.

Positively, a stable and democratic Iraq would likely positively influence fledgling democratic movements in Iran, in Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait, etc.. Professor Ajami's central contention is that the long term solution for the considerable Arab discontent in Middle Eastern countries lies in the promotion of real democracy in the area, a real sense of self-direction among the populace their, and real opportunities for economic self-development, real free expression in the press- few of which exist today. Much of that frustration finds a convenient vent in anti-American sentiment that is really a mask for muted criticism of their unelected leaders.

It is a vision that has the distinct virtue of being idealistic, bold and big, a long-term reconstruction like unto the Marshall Plan that followed World War 2.

But as Nicholas Lehman points out, it is not without considerable challenges and unforeseen problems that could become bigger than the original problem. Given the frustration of a Shiite majority that has been oppressed for the whole of Hussein's rule and a Kurdish nation that has no country, many of whom have been exiled from their homes, and the marsh people that have been subjected to a wholesale genocide, Lehman points out that we are likely inheriting not a post-War Germany, but more likely a post-War Yugolslavia that could quickly disentigrate into an anarchy impossible to unite in one collective entity.

It would entail a very long time commitment and a very considerable expenditure of money. In answer to those who continue to suggest that our actual motivation for invading Iraq is to control oil, a number of economists have recently pointed out that the actual costs for battle, not to mention rebuilding, would make this far and away the most expensive oil we have ever purchased.

Furthermore, our actual ability to rebuild any nation rests largely on the moral authority that other nations grant us for such an invasive and structural reformation. We had such a wide latitude in Japan and Germany following World War 2 because that moral authority was implicitly and explicitly conferred by other nations and it was sustained over the couple decades that followed the war because time and again our good will in Europe and Japan was demonstrated by concrete acts of aid that were the building blocks for self-development.

Absent having that moral authority conferred on us by our allies and our foes, we will only generate resentment, a committed cynicism about our motives, and a critique of the hypocrisy of our foreign policy. In short, a military victory alone would be pyrhhic and a long term burr in our saddle.

Lehman and a few others have pointed out that we are actually entering a new chapter in American history should we proceed down this path that will likely grow into something of a Pax Americana. It is an enormous undertaking that may well be overreach of the kind that recalls the words of Reinhold Niebuhr during the Cold War. Said Niebuhr, “America is never so dangerous as when she acts out of her highest ideals.” Overreach has, in the past, had tragic and ironic consequences.

It is a very difficult challenge. I had the opportunity to speak for several hours last November with a group of our Green Berets that were just returning from many months in Afghanistan, where they are trying to develop a secure infrastructure that could develop instutitions that could support the future development of something like democracy in a region that has very little sense of national identity, as opposed to tribal/factional identity. “How”, I asked them, “are we going to develop democracy in a generation in a culture that hasn't developed anything like it for themselves in the past 20 generations?”

One Colonel responded succinctly. Said he, “Sir, the problem that we have is that we have been asked to establish democracy in a country with no history of it, amongst a culture of people that have no real indigenous values to support it, for a people that don't know they need it.”

In many ways, the same thing might have been said about Japan in 1944, but that only underscores the difficulty of the task ahead. It is, unquestionably, a frustrating era in the marketplace of ideas. Perhaps you saw the article by the President of the American University in Beruit, which I believe was in The Atlantic Monthly recently. He pointed out that middle class parents, throughout the Middle East, prefer to send their children to American universities and American secondary schools because they recognize that something is available there, a set of values and a manner of education, that they would prefer for their children. The noble political ideals our country was founded on are not only healing, they are very popular. But imposing them is quite another thing.

Finally, if you are wondering why the Minister does not have more on peace making alternatives to put before you this morning, it is because the literature supporting serious alternatives has been… underwhelming to be generous.

The most serious and articulate spokesman from the peace movement I have read has been Jonathan Schell, who has recently published articles in Harper's[v] and The Nation. [vi] Given Schell's long history covering nuclear disarmament, dating back to the Cold War, he has a penchant for discerning the irony of dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction.

In his pantheon of the 5 most immediate nuclear threats to the United States from ‘rogue nations' to quote the parlance of the Administration, he cites Iraq as number 5. Number 4, I believe is Iran, whose nuclear program has just this week been detailed by a defector in an interview with an Egyptian newspaper.[vii] Third, I believe is Russia, simply because of the lack of oversight over their considerable supply of weapons grade plutonium. Second, is North Korea. But, first, because of their obvious connection to Al Qaeda, general instability, and whole areas of their country that are beyond civil control- Pakistan. Schell notes that the father of the nuclear bomb in Pakistan met with Osama Bin Laden shortly before the attacks of September 11th and that Bin Laden has claimed in the past to have the capability of producing a dirty bomb.

Schell's argument, and it is worthy of serious consideration, is that our ultimate goal of containing or controlling weapons of mass destruction can only be accomplished through a world-wide negotiation of all the nations that agrees to eliminate their production or to limit them.

Such a conference would indeed be something to pray for. But, he sidesteps the overarching problem of all such conferences in our immediate future, the problem of enforcement. While our world might be growing into a recognition that only a comity of nations such as the United Nations has the moral or political authority to sponsor such a conference, no nation is willing to cede the United Nations the military capability to enforce agreements that might be reached. Unfortunately, the only military capable of enforcing treaties is the United States military, and even our allies are increasingly uncomfortable with entrusting us with that role because the imbalance of power is so wide and widening every decade that it threatens to become an issue in and of itself before we are old.

We have been given a number of slogans like ‘War is not the Answer', however precious few concrete suggestions as to how to deal with planned terrorist threats or rogue states like Iraq that do not rely principally on the use of the military. At the moment, the peace movement is focused on the Anti-War dimension of the peace making mission. We are given many sensible reasons to slow the march to attack, to give the process a chance to work.

But this still does not answer the question of what we should do when we finally determine fully and comprehensively that we, in fact, have a threat posed against us. How do we realistically contain the threats of terrorism while at the same time doing things that make for peace?

I wish that I could come to you with a more definite answer to this question but I'm afraid this is not a season for such clarity. Therefore, it is my hope that in sharing our thoughts on this subject collectively and soberly, we might all mature somewhat, and a future resolution might emerge sooner. With a prayer for the Spirit to move amongst all of us, I now open the floor for your reactions and your general comments, as the bulletin says ‘Your intelligent reflections and considered convictions.'

[i] Kenneth M. Pollack “A Last Chance to Stop Iraq” NYT (Friday, February 21, 2003) p. A27.

[ii] Fouad Ajami “Iraq and the Arabs' Future”(Foreign Affairs, January/February 2003)

[iii] Fouad Ajami, “Will Iraq's liberation help free Iran? WSJ, (February 12, 2003), Op-ed page.

[iv] Nicholas Lemann “Letter from Washington: After Iraq, can the Administration remake the Middle East? (February 17& 24, 2003), pp. 70 ff.

[v] Jonathan Schell, Harper's (January, 2003) "The Unfinished Twentieth Century: What We Have Forgotten About Nuclear Weapons".

[vi] Jonathan Schell The Nation (February 25, 2002) “Disarmament Wars”.

[vii] See the website for MEMRI for the English translation and a condensed version of the interview.